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Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on
Terrorism
Abstract
This paper assesses the parameters and utility of “targeted killing” in combating terrorism
and its role within the norm of state self-defense in the international community. The
author’s thesis is that, while targeted killing provides states with a method of combating
terrorism, and while it is “effective” on a number of levels, it is inherently limited and not a
panacea. The adoption and execution of such a program brings with it, among other
potential pitfalls, political repercussions. Targeted killing is defined herein as the
premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or
believed to represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a state
through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals. The principal conclusions of this
paper are that targeted killing: Must be wholly differentiated from “assassination” and
related operations involving the intentional targeting of an individual during wartime, in
order to be considered properly and rationally. Is a politically risky undertaking with
potentially negative international implications. Is the proven desire of some terrorist
groups to conduct attacks involving mass casualties against innocent civilians that may, in
the future, cause states to reconsider previous abstention from adopting targeted killing in
order to protect their populace. Can serve to impact terrorists and terrorist groups on a
strategic,operational, and tactical level. Has historically had both negative and
(unintentionally) positiveimpacts for terrorist groups. Oftentimes exposes civilians to
unintentional harm. The methods of investigation include a thorough review of the
available literature: books, published and unpublished essays, interviews of 2 selected
individuals (to include academics and retired members of military and police forces), and
the author’s independent analysis.
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Targeted Killing: Self-Defense,
Preemption, and the War on Terrorism
Thomas Byron Hunter, M.A., M.Litt.

Killing a man is murder unless you do it to the sound of trumpets.
—Voltaire

Summary
This paper assesses the parameters and utility of “targeted killing” in
combating terrorism and its role within the norm of state self-defense in
the international community. The author’s thesis is that, while targeted
killing provides states with a method of combating terrorism, and while
it is “effective” on a number of levels, it is inherently limited and not a
panacea. The adoption and execution of such a program brings with it,
among other potential pitfalls, political repercussions.
Targeted killing is defined herein as the premeditated, preemptive, and
intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to
represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a
state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals.
The principal conclusions of this paper are that targeted killing:
● Must be wholly differentiated from “assassination” and related
operations involving the intentional targeting of an individual during
wartime, in order to be considered properly and rationally.
● Is a politically risky undertaking with potentially negative international implications.
● Is the proven desire of some terrorist groups to conduct attacks involving mass casualties against innocent civilians that may, in the future,
cause states to reconsider previous abstention from adopting targeted
killing in order to protect their populace.
● Can serve to impact terrorists and terrorist groups on a strategic,
operational, and tactical level.
● Has historically had both negative and (unintentionally) positive
impacts for terrorist groups.
● Oftentimes exposes civilians to unintentional harm.
The methods of investigation include a thorough review of the available
literature: books, published and unpublished essays, interviews of
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selected individuals (to include academics and retired members of military and police forces), and the author’s independent analysis.

Introduction
This paper examines the dynamic of “targeted killing” as it relates to
the phenomenon of modern international terrorism and the individual
state’s rights to self-defense.
Due to the nature of modern international terrorism, particularly in its
suicide form, and its emergence on the world stage primarily after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, academic focus on this type of potential
response—targeted killing—has been limited. Consequently, this paper
endeavors to contribute an essentially new and largely unexplored insight
into targeted killing as it pertains to the state’s right to defend its
citizens.
Given the paucity of scholarly study on targeted killing, and the natural
reluctance of nations to acknowledge any formal policy, there is relatively
little published literature (aside from a small number of essays appearing
primarily in academic journals) against which to balance the findings
and conclusions presented in this paper. The bulk of the available
literature used as reference material herein was derived from works
pertaining to related topics, such as assassination, conventional and
unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and the norm of state selfdefense.
This paper also makes extensive use of case studies involving groups
(e.g., HAMAS, Irish Republican Army [IRA], etc.) and cites both “covert”
and “overt” state policy as employed over the last 30 years by nations
such as Israel and Great Britain in order to better elucidate the motivating factors and the risks involved in this dynamic.

Defining and Explaining Targeted Killing
Discussions pertaining to a national-level policy of premeditated killing
of suspected or known terrorists have been hampered historically by the
lack of accurate and agreed on definitions of this type of policy. Terms
such as “extrajudicial killing,” “extrajudicial punishment,” “selective targeting,” “assassination policy,” “named killing,” and even “long-range hot
pursuit” have been used to describe this specific type of activity.1 While
some of these terms may have partial merit, others serve only to confuse
the discussion and hinder debate.
2
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For the purposes of this paper, the author adopts the term “targeted
killing” for the following reasons: first and most importantly, this type of
offensive counterterrorism action frequently elicits emotional and subjective reactions in the public at large,2 which can result in more pejorative
designations, effectively hindering rational and unbiased discussion of
the topic. Second, targeted killing is not equivalent to assassination—a
term frequently and mistakenly applied to targeted killing—and thus to
equate the two results is a misnomer that, again, hampers the discussion.
The author defines targeted killing as the premeditated, preemptive, and
intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to
represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a
state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals. The latter
portion of this definition is of particular importance, because the unique
nature of terrorism provides states with the specific rationale for the
implementation of a policy of targeted killing.
Targeted killings, whether conducted by Israel, the United States, Great
Britain, or other nations, are more frequently the result of action undertaken not by conventional military forces, but rather by specialized
troops, such as special operations forces (SOF), police, and intelligence
agents, as discussed in greater detail in the following text. Alternately,
some nations have turned increasingly to specialized equipment, such as
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in order to stalk their prey. These specialized troops and equipment have proven to be an essential component
of targeted killing, due primarily to the elusive and clandestine nature of
terrorists themselves.3
Rather than operating from fixed bases, terrorists often use the basements of homes, rented apartments, caves, nomadic encampments, and
other locations from which they conduct their planning and subsequent
attacks. Moreover, their travel is often concealed, as they do not move
about in marked military personnel carriers, but rather in civilian vehicles that are nearly impossible to distinguish. In response to the tactics,
conventional weapons of war such as tanks and heavy bombers are all but
useless. This type of warfare requires a combination of accurate intelligence, highly trained and specialized soldiers, and oftentimes the use
of unique and advanced tracking and detection equipment. Such is the
nature of targeted killing.
It is for these reasons, and those cited in later sections of this paper, that
targeted killing has become a preferred, although inherently limited,
method of reducing the threat of terrorism—particularly that posed
by specific individuals. While defining this action and providing its
3
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basic operational methodologies are relatively simple undertakings,
the implementation of this action by the state must also be justified at a
governmental level, and to define and agree to such a course of action is a
complex undertaking.

Targeted Killing versus Assassination
Before proceeding with an examination of targeted killing as a method of
state self-defense in the war on terrorism, it is important to differentiate
between targeted killing and assassination. This is an important distinction in the context of this discussion for two primary reasons: to clearly
illuminate the differences between the two, and secondly, to demonstrate
that targeted killing is not a method for expressing political or ideological
differences, but rather a purely defensive act intended to protect the state
and its populace.
Though numerous scholars and other experts have tried, the concept and
practice of assassination has proven a complicated concept to define.4
Decades of research and the resultant books and papers have failed to
result in comprehensive and shared parameters and characteristics for
this complex concept. For purposes of this discussion, assassination is
defined as the premeditated killing of a prominent person for political
or ideological reasons.
Assassination, as a political tool, was long considered an acceptable and
rational action. As a method of statecraft, it dates back to the earliest
recorded governments and includes the death of Julius Caesar in March 44
B.C. Since that time, individuals, groups, and states have participated in the
killings of prominent persons (usually heads of state or senior government
officials) in order to further their own political or ideological goals. One
notable government body was, in fact, based on the concept of assassination.
The Ismalian sect founded by Hasan ibn-al-Sabbah had, as its primary
function, assassination. Indeed, it has been long believed that we derive the
term “assassination” in use today from the “assassins”—the Hashashi of
this sect, though the validity of this belief is currently under debate.5,6
The practice of assassination was long used as a method of expediting
political or ideological goals is, as mentioned, a matter of historical fact.
What is also equally clear is that assassination, as we term it here, has not
been used to preemptively eliminate an individual who planned, personally or as part of a larger group, to asymmetrically attack a given state.7
Instead, this particular type of killing is reserved for the elimination of
political and ideological opponents of prominence.
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Despite this background, assassination is today considered a politically
and morally unacceptable activity, and has fallen into disuse as a tool in
the statecraft of modern nations, though formal steps to renounce its use
came about only in the latter half of the twentieth century.8,9 Even the
United States, which formally outlawed political assassination in 1970
with the signing of Executive Order 12333, was not above employing such
tactics, particularly during the Cold War.10–12
We are able to draw a distinct line between assassination and targeted
killing. In sum, assassination is the killing of an individual or group of
individuals for purely political or ideological reasons. Targeted killing,
in contrast, is the killing of an individual or group of individuals without
regard for politics or ideology, but rather exclusively for reasons of state
self-defense.

The Norm of Self-Defense
The norm of self-defense may (in its simplest and most basic form)
be said to be the right of a sovereign nation to defend itself from
internal and external aggression. Self-defense in its truest sense is, of
course, the right of every nation, none of whom are bound to United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval in order to exercise this
right. In the most basic example, if a nation is invaded by a n
 eighbor,
it has the right to use force to repel that invasion. It need not wait
until it has pleaded its case to the UN and received Security Council
approval to do so. Such a requirement would violate a basic tenet of
sovereignty.
This simple example is not intended to suggest that self-defense is not a
complex issue, with many different components and arguments relating
to its implementation. Innumerable books, articles, papers, and dissertations have been written describing and assessing the various conditions
and limits of this norm.
For example, as highlighted in David Rodin’s War & Self-Defense, there
is a difference in the culpability of the aggressor and the innocence of
the defender.13 There is also the issue of historical background, such as
in the case of lands taken from a people by force, who then later rise up
to reclaim it.14 The question then arises: who is the aggressor and who is
the defender? As stated in the introduction, this paper does not seek to
answer these broader questions of the norm of self-defense, but rather
seeks to clarify whether targeted killing is a justified form of self-defense,
and under which conditions it may be employed.
5
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In this international world in which sovereign nations endeavor to exist
peacefully despite border disputes, fragile treaties, political differences,
and other dynamics, self-defense sometimes becomes not a mere matter of black and white, as suggested in the initial example, but rather a
complex, multilayered consideration. The UN was formed, in part, to untangle this web and to give nations a forum in which to air grievances and
settle disputes peacefully. As history has shown, this effort has proven
successful in some cases, less successful in others.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first
century, it has become evident that terrorism, particularly conducted by
non-state actors employing transnational terrorism (that is to say without respect for national borders), has become commonplace. Thus, the
traditional methods of warfare and self-defense have been thrust into disarray and challenged to their core. States have largely responded to this
threat on an individual level, choosing to react to the threat in their own
particular ways, while citing their right to self-defense. In some cases,
and increasingly so following the attacks of 9/11 and the resulting actions
of the United States, this has meant an escalation in instances of military
preemption—attacking before the terrorists themselves can strike.
Needless to say, this proactive approach to countering terrorism has
resulted in no small number of instances in which states have found
themselves up against the previously solid walls of national sovereignty.
As terrorists established safe havens in Afghanistan during the 1990s, for
example, the United States has chosen to launch missile strikes against
bases there in an effort to kill the terrorists it believed, or knew to be,
planning attacks against it.15 There was little political fallout from these
attacks, as nations began to realize that the new terrorist threat, particularly that posed by Islamic extremists, differed greatly from the domestic
threats historically posed by the IRA in the United Kingdom, Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), who typically stayed within the geographic
area in which they had their primary grievances.
This is not to say that states did not recognize the threats posed by terrorists operating regionally. For example, the best-known case of targeted
killing, the Israeli pursuit of Black September terrorists following the
1972 Munich Olympics, occurred throughout Europe and the Middle East
(see later case study for further details). Thus, there is ample evidence
that in some of these cases, states chose to operate in violation of other
states’ sovereignty in order to conduct reprisals or to otherwise eliminate
perceived terrorist threats.
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Self-defense and preemption, while perhaps less controversial now than
in times past, remains a vociferous subject of international debate. And
this debate rises to one of its most heated levels when discussing the
practice of targeted killing. Nonetheless, this practice remains at the
forefront of the counterterrorist actions of nations such as the United
States, Israel, Russia, and, until recently, Great Britain. The inherent
nature of transnational terrorism precludes much of what may have previously proven effective against conventional enemies in wars past, such
as tanks, massed ground forces, and artillery barrages.
Today, the threat hides in cities, mountains, slums, refugee camps, and
caves—virtually anywhere it can find a safe haven from which to operate.
Therefore, these conventional tools are largely an anachronism (save the
unique case of Afghanistan). The rise of targeted killing, then, comes as
little surprise due to its specific nature of limiting offensive action to those
individuals and locations in which the enemy can be found and engaged.

The United Nations, Self-Defense, and Preemption
The right of a nation to take action to defend itself is spelled out in Article
51 of the United Nations Charter, which states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.16
Many nations have cited Article 51 as a basis for their primary right to
undertake unilateral military actions, citing the requirement of selfdefense, with or without UN approval. This has, in some cases, worked
out well for the acting state (resulting in little or no argument in the UN),
yet in some cases, as with the Israeli attack on Iraq, resulted in international condemnation.
Targeted killing is, without question, a form of preemption. Its goal is to
proactively eliminate terrorists before they have a chance to inflict harm
7
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on the affected state’s citizens and or homeland. However, in many cases
of preemption, the states undertaking this action have not sought or been
granted authority to do so under the auspices (or even with the sanction
of) of the UNSC, and thus the action may be viewed as illegal.17 For this
reason, states taking part in a program of targeted killing against a terrorist threat risk political capital and international prestige when taking
such unilateral action.
This type of “anticipatory self-defense” has taken many forms over the
years, such as Israel’s strike against Arab targets in the opening hours of
the Six Day War in 1967.18,19 While a conventional attack (as opposed to
asymmetric) and unrelated to terrorism, it is clear that ample evidence
existed to convince Israel that a wide scale invasion was imminent and
that it needed to strike first in order to survive the expected conflict.20
While undertaken without UN authorization, the negative political consequences of this action were few, due to the obvious nature of the pending
threat.
Israel was not so lucky in 1981, when it unilaterally bombed Iraq’s Osirak
nuclear reactor complex, which it claimed was being used to create nuclear weapons for use against Israel. Following the attack, the UN Security
Council unanimously adopted a highly critical resolution, followed by
an even more strongly worded resolution that appeared tantamount to a
threat against Israel, should it repeat its attack.21,22 Thus, while Israel may
have eliminated a potential future threat, it suffered greatly for its actions
in the court of world opinion.
So, it appears clear that the concept of self-defense, even as defined in
Article 51 is a flexible and debatable concept. As Thomas Frank astutely
concludes in Recourse to Force:
When the facts and their political content are widely seen to warrant
a pre-emptive or deterrent intervention on behalf of credibly endangered citizens abroad, and if the UN itself, for political reasons, is
incapable of acting, then some use of force by a state may be accepted
as legitimate self defense with the meaning of Article 51.23
The recourse to targeted killing (in itself, preemption), then, may be
viewed as a legitimate self-defense in the war against terrorism. As the
threat is often transnational and asymmetric, the UN is institutionally
and materially ill equipped to deal with each terrorist threat as it arises
and spreads. Thus, nations are largely left on their own to resolve the
problem.
8

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1

Hunter: Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terror

Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, P
 reemption, and the War on Terrorism

Targeted Killing and Conventional Warfare
One distinction that must be made is that between the use of targeted
killing in conventional warfare, with its inherent restrictions as found in
the Geneva Conventions, and that of asymmetric warfare. Tradition and
the unwritten military code of conduct on the battlefield, too, played a
role in restricting the specific targeting of individuals, at least for period
of time.
For example, the tacit prohibition of the intentional and specific killing of
generals and other senior officers in wartime is largely a result of historical precedent in which a sort of gentlemen’s agreement existed whereby
such activity was considered uncivilized.24 This is not to say, however,
that such killings did not occur. During the 1700s and 1800s, sharpshooters on opposing military vessels often targeted officers in order to disrupt
command and control and to lower enemy morale.25
There is also evidence that the presence of a particular officer in battle
may have merited special attention from the enemy. For example, during the battle of Trafalgar in 1805, British Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson
was felled by a sniper’s bullet. There can be little doubt that the French
marksman in that incident was aware that he was targeting Nelson, due
not in the least to the distinctive uniforms worn by officers on both sides
during the battle.26
More to the point, however, is the decision by which a nation’s political
or military leaders target a specific individual of the opposing military
forces. The goal of such an action is, ostensibly, to remove an officer of
such high regard that his death would constitute a significant degradation
of enemy warfighting capability—a perfectly legal and acceptable action
in the conduct of warfare— provided such actions are taken openly
and not through the use of what the Geneva Conventions describe as
“perfidy,” as described in the following text.
Examples of a state choosing to target an individual military commander
include (but are certainly not limited to) the failed British attempt to kill
German Field Marshal Irwin Rommel during the North African campaign, the successful British–Czech plot to kill SS Obergurppenführer
Reinhard Heydrich in 1942, and, more recently, U.S. efforts to eliminate
Saddam Hussein and his sons during the early days of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.27–29
A valuable case study in this context is that of the purposeful and premeditated killing of Japanese Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto during World
9
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War II. In April 1943, American code breakers intercepted a message indicating that Admiral Yamamoto would be traveling by air between military bases in the South Pacific. News of this movement was immediately
sent to the highest echelons of both the military and civilian leadership,
and a mission specifically intended to kill the admiral was approved.30
On April 18, 1943, American fighter planes intercepted a flight of
Japanese military aircraft transporting Yamamoto to a nearby Japanese
base. In the ensuing engagement, Yamamoto’s aircraft was shot down
and the admiral was killed.
One could make the case that the premeditated killing of Yamamoto
and the other cases cited here constitute evidence of targeted killing.
If we are to argue that targeted killing is the “premeditated, preemptive,
and deliberate killing of an individual or individuals known to represent
a clear and present threat to the safety and security of a state,” then
perhaps such an argument might have some merit. This is not the case,
however. If we put considerations of terrorism aside for the moment,
it is evident that military leaders, being part of a military at war, are
valid and legitimate targets, the killing of whom is justified under the
laws of war.
What is important here is the manner in which the killing is attempted.
The 1977 protocol to the Geneva Convention specifically forbids the use
of “perfidy,” such as masquerading as a civilian or as a representative of
a neutral party (such as the Red Cross).31 In this case, if a soldier used
such methods in order to gain proximity to a given target, he would be in
violation of the Geneva Convention and (ostensibly) prosecutable under
international law as a war criminal.
By way of example, the plan to kill General Rommel involved the use of
commandos who, infiltrated behind enemy lines via submarine and using other methods of operational subterfuge, operated largely within the
boundaries of the Convention, to include wearing Allied military uniforms. However, the killers of Obergurppenführer Heydrich in 1942 took
a much different approach, wearing civilian clothes and operating outside
the parameters of accepted military conduct.32
Thus, we can see that the targeting of military leaders of an opposing
armed force while in a state of war is a legally acceptable action, and does
not represent an example of targeted killing. But what happens when the
leader of a given state is deemed responsible for harboring terrorists, or
sponsors their nefarious activities?
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Self-Defense and Targeting State Leaders
As argued previously, the targeting of prominent individuals, such as
heads of state, clearly falls under the rubric of assassination. However,
one could would argue that when that official has direct involvement
with and is supportive of a terrorist organization, then his protected
status should be called into question—and becomes even more pertinent
if that official wears the rank of a military officer. States are clearly
responsible for making distinctions between assassination of heads of
state and the targeted killing of terrorists, though the issue is, at best, a
murky one.
Israel, for example, consistently vacillated on its position as to the targeted killing of Yassir Arafat. Citing his ongoing guidance of and support
for Palestinian terrorism, Israeli leaders frequently named Arafat as a
legitimate target. Prior to his death, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
assured President George Bush that he would not kill Arafat. This assurance was reportedly later withdrawn.33 Ultimately, for reasons unknown,
Israel did not undertake such an operation.
Another case study of interest is that of the U.S. attack on Libya in 1986.
Following the bombing of the La Belle disco in Germany, the United
States unilaterally attacked Libya in retribution and to strike terrorist
training facilities located in the country.34 Accordingly, the majority of
targets chosen were linked to known or suspected terrorist activities.
One of the targets selected, however, included one of the five personal
residences of Libyan president Muhammar Khadafi. Though the presence
of his home was known to planners, there is no evidence to indicate that
Khadafi himself was intentionally targeted; however, nor was there any
effort made to remove the residence from the list.
The ensuing attack resulted in the destruction of numerous facilities
(including the Khadafi residence in which his 18-month-old adopted
daughter was killed), aircraft, vehicles, ships, and an estimated eighty
soldiers.35 In the years following the raid, Libyan support for terrorism
waned and eventually disappeared. The United States and Libya have
discussed the removal of Libya from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.36 Some scholars and authors have argued that the raid on Libya
directly influenced Khadafi to opt out of the terrorist business.37
While the factual argument could be made that the leader of a state
might justifiably be considered a viable option for targeted killing, it

11
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is highly unlikely that any state would proceed with such an action
without careful consideration. Such a decision might force the state to
withstand the likely perception that it has embarked on a state-sponsored
assassination—and risk becoming an international pariah.

Counterterrorism and Conventional Warfare
Targeted killing is not the killing of a terrorist during routine military or
security operations, such as bombing a suspected terrorist camp simply
to deny its use by extremists, or raiding a suspected safe house in which
unknown terrorists may be located. Targeted killing, for the purposes of
this paper, is limited to the specific selection of an individual or individuals, who are then tracked down and intentionally killed due to their
specific involvement in a terrorist group or action.
This is not to say that a targeted killing cannot occur as part of a larger
operation. The scope of the targeted action need not be limited to a strike
on a single vehicle, for example. Such was the case with U.S. air operations in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of 9/11; a targeted
killing (or an attempt at targeted killing) may be conducted as part of a
coordinated offensive against a larger enemy (e.g., the Taliban). Such an
attempt took place on October 7, 2001, when U.S. warplanes bombed
the residence of Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban. While this attack
did not succeed in eliminating its target, it does provide a clear example
of a state incorporating targeted killing into a larger overall military
campaign.
Additionally, given the dynamic nature of counterterrorist operations,
and even during conventional operations, there are occasions when intelligence is uncovered which may lead to the location of a named, wanted
terrorist. Tactical intelligence data surfacing in a larger military engagement may present important opportunities for a coordinated targeted
killing operation. This can occur in virtually any larger military operation
targeting terrorists, such as was often demonstrated during the U.S.
campaign in Afghanistan. It comes as no surprise, therefore that a
targeted killing operation may, on occasion, arise as a hastily coordinated
effort stemming from a much larger military engagement.
Thus, we can see that the death of a terrorist (even a wanted and
named terrorist) that occurs coincidentally during the course of a military
offensive or operation cannot be termed “targeted killing.” If intelligence
is uncovered, however, during such an action, then a targeted killing
may be instigated and acted upon even while that offensive is underway.
12
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Considering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), pose potentially the greatest risk
of creating massive casualties in the event of a terrorist attack. These
weapons (to include the compounds or agents that comprise the lethal
component of the same) are generally considered in the following four
categories:
1. Nuclear (stolen nuclear warheads, “suitcase nukes,” etc.)
2. Radiological (“dirty bombs”)38
3. Biological (Anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague, smallpox, etc.)39
4. Chemical (biotoxins, blister agents/vesicants, nerve agents, etc.)40
Any one of these four categories of weapons brings with it the possibility of a catastrophic level of casualties, depending, of course, on the wide
variety of variables inherent in the type, method of delivery, location, and
other critical aspects of employment. Thus, potentially, targeted killing
becomes an exponentially more important consideration when assessing
whether a given terrorist or terrorists are, at any level, pursuing WMD for
use in an attack. Individuals who would be likely to rise to the top of the
list as candidates for targeted killing in this regard include (in no particular order of importance):
1. Scientists providing technical expertise in the production or construction/weaponization of WMD devices or compounds;
2. Terrorists known to be actively seeking to obtain WMD;
3. Terrorists known to be in possession of WMD;
4. Sympathetic logisticians or supporters working on behalf of a terrorist
group to procure WMD.
Obligated to protect its citizens, a state must now consider the new
threats posed by terrorists who may be, or actually are, in possession of
WMD, in a light perhaps not previously considered by states expecting
more conventional threats. In such cases—where a state may know or
believe that terrorists are in possession of WMD and planning an attack
involving these devices—the motivation and incentive to conduct a targeted killing will understandably become a greater priority.
According to Walter Laquer, in The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the
Arms of Mass Destruction, the threat posed by these weapons has heralded an entirely new dynamic with regard to the terrorist threat:
For the first time in history, weapons of enormous destructive power
are both readily acquired and harder to track. In this new age, even
13
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the cost of hundreds of lives may appear small in retrospect…there is
as much fanaticism and madness as there ever was, and there are now
very powerful weapons of mass destruction available to the terrorist.41
Also to be considered in this category are the related threats posed by
terrorists who may seek to strike at nuclear power plants or chemical
facilities in order to release radioactive gasses or toxic clouds to cause
mass casualties. Following 9/11, numerous U.S. government agencies
concluded that American nuclear power plants were indeed vulnerable to
such attacks, and suggested steps to increase security.42 These concerns
are not new, of course, but these concerns must not be excluded from any
discussion of the terrorist threat to such facilities.43
These latter threats are included here specifically to highlight the threat
that may be posed by a single individual or a small group of individuals
who, while not in possession of WMD, may cause mass casualties due
to the nature of their target. In short, terrorists need not bear WMD in
order to represent a threat equal to the use of WMD.
It may be said, then, that states should be more inclined to consider
offensive, pre-emptive actions in order to counter these new terrorist
threats. To rely on previously sufficient or accepted modes of “counterterrorism” or “antiterrorism” may expose the state to a level of risk not
previously understood or appreciated.44 Therefore, we can see that it is
possible that states may come to consider or even rely on targeted killing
as an accepted form of preemption, or, in fact, realize that it may have no
alternative than to resort to this course of action, even if such a consideration was once anathema to the national consensus and consciousness
against such a practice.

Who Conducts Targeted Killings?
Due to the fact that targeted killings are largely carried out in the utmost
secrecy, it is difficult to ascribe any single killing to any particular individual, unit, agency, military, or even a given nation. In some cases, such
as attacks on Palestinian extremists in the Gaza Strip, the perpetrator is
almost exclusively Israel, which is often ascribed responsibility for such
incidents.45 But whom, then, does Israel call on to carry out such actions?
An examination of this dynamic provides insight into the delicate nature
of targeted killing and, for that reason, is warranted here.
Typically, states call on the most secretive elements of their national civilian and military agencies to conduct these operations. In particular, those
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assigned to such missions are usually drawn from intelligence, special
operations, or other elite professions. The reasons for this are obvious:
specialized training in reconnaissance, close quarters combat, explosives,
communications, and clandestine or covert operations.
It is this latter skill and experience that usually provides states with the
most valued component of a targeted killing operation: plausible deniability. Plausible deniability is the specific effort of a state to conceal
the nature and relation of the targeted killing team and its action to the
sponsoring state. In this way a state can participate in this activity with,
ostensibly, little risk that a discovered attack will be attributed to it, thus
avoiding possible political repercussions on the world stage or even
retaliation from the target’s supporters, if any.
Thus, in Israel, these missions are typically assigned to members of the
Mossad (responsible for human intelligence collection, counterterrorism,
and covert action), Shin Bet (internal security), Aman (military intelligence) or one of a number of highly trained police or military special
operations units, such as the elite Sayeret Matkal.46
In the United States, a few select units carry out these types of operations. These include the Central Intelligence Agency’s Special Activities
Staff (within the Directorate of Operations), the U.S. Army’s Delta
Force, and the U.S. Navy’s Naval Special Warfare Development Group
(also known as SEAL Team Six).47 Other, more conventional units may
also be called on, as needed, to conduct such operations (particularly in
the event that these more specialized units are not within an acceptable
striking distance of a fleeting target, though these instances are likely
rare.
These units, which have similar counterparts in dozens of other nations,
including Russia, France, and Great Britain, are specifically trained to
operate clandestinely and covertly, including operating in civilian attire,
using false documentation and identities. They are equally proficient in
the use of small arms, explosives, and other requisite skills.
It is important to note the nature of these personnel, as their ability to
operate without attribution to their sponsor state is of paramount importance in most instances of targeted killing. Unless a state chooses to make
public its participation in such actions, that state must possess these
requisite skills in order to undertake such missions. Thus, we can see that
states without these types of operatives are limited in their abilities, and
may not be able to make use of targeted killing without risking national
or international exposure and the problems inherent therein.
15
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State Study: Israel
For decades, Israel has been the world’s leading practitioner of targeted
killing. It has consistently cited its need to defend its citizens from the
actions of Palestinian terrorists and related threats. This policy has
sparked no end of debate, both within Israel and around the world.48
Nonetheless, it has also resulted in the only known codification of the
prerequisites for targeted killing.
In April 2002, Israeli Defense Force (IDF) lawyers set forth the following
four conditions for targeted killing:49
● There must be well-supported information showing that the terrorist
will plan or carry out a terrorist attack in the near future.
● The policy can be enacted only after appeals to the Palestinian Authority calling for the terrorist’s arrest have been ignored.
● Attempts to arrest the suspect by use of IDF troops have failed.
● The targeted killing is not to be carried out in retribution for events of
the past. Instead it can only be done to prevent attacks in the future
which are liable to toll multiple casualties.
In January 2003, former Israeli intelligence officials claimed that Israel
had expanded its policy of targeted killing to the discharging of such
action in other nations, including the United States.50 This assertion was
vehemently denied by current Israeli officials, but historical evidence
is clear on the fact that Tel Aviv has previously authorized such operations.51
However, codified or not, rarely does an instance of targeted killing
conducted by the Israelis go without notice or some form of public
remonstration. The greatest recent political fallout from Israel’s ongoing
application of this practice occurred in 2004 with the killing of HAMAS
spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.

Case Study: The Killing of HAMAS Spiritual Leader Sheikh
Yassin
On March 22, 2004, founder and spiritual leader of the Palestinian terrorist group HAMAS, 67-year-old Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was killed by
guided missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter as he was pushed in his
wheelchair from a mosque en route to his vehicle. The killing sparked
protests in the Middle East and formal condemnation from nations such
as Britain and France.52,53
16

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1

Hunter: Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terror

Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, P
 reemption, and the War on Terrorism

As the founder of HAMAS, Yassin was an early participant in the planning of terrorist activities. His role in recent years however, at least in
public perception, was that of primarily that of a spiritual rather than an
operational leader. Because much of the world viewed his killing through
a religious prism, Israel was placed in the awkward position of justifying
the death of an elderly, crippled man who was bound to a wheelchair and
unable to take an active role in terrorist attacks.
The political fallout from his death was multiplied because world opinion
felt the killing had a negative impact on the ongoing and sensitive Middle
East peace process. It was for this reason that the world audience called
into question his killing (though this was also due to its negative impact
on the sensitive Middle East peace process): how could Israel justify killing an elderly, wheelchair-bound civilian who was obviously not going to
be participating in any attacks himself?
From Israel’s perspective, given Yassin’s continued affiliation with
HAMAS—he often blessed those who took part in attacks against
Israelis—he clearly represented a terrorist threat and was complicit in
their actions. Nonetheless, this answer, when coupled with the widespread media coverage of Yassin in his wheelchair prior to the attack and
later photos of the destroyed wheelchair generated widespread criticism
and condemnation of Israel in the world community.
In sum, the targeted killing of Yassin is an example of an operation that
was technically justifiable and well within the parameters produced by
the Israelis, but which was condemned by the international community
and which cost Tel Aviv a large amount of political capital.
In February 2005, Israel announced a package of concessions to the Palestinians that included an end to the policy of targeted killings.54 Whether
or not Israel adheres to this decision will depend on the level of future
Palestinian terrorist aggression. Should such attacks resume and escalate, it is likely that Israel will opt to resume its policy of targeted killing
as an early response.

State Study: United States
Prior to 1985, the United States preferred to remain in a reactive posture
with regard to international terrorism. Following the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro by Palestinian terrorists, and the resultant
execution of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer, this posture became more
forward leaning. According to former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
17
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Netanyahu, the genesis of this more offensive approach originated, in
part, in a series of discussions between Netanyahu and then-Secretary of
State George Shultz.55 In a 1985 speech at the Jonathan Institute, Shultz
stated:
Can we as a country, can the community of free nations, stand in a
purely defensive posture and absorb the blows dealt by terrorists?
I think not. From a practical standpoint, a purely passive d
 efense
does not provide enough of a deterrent to terrorism and the states
that sponsor it. It is time to think long, hard, and seriously about
more active means of defense—defense through appropriate
preventive or preemptive actions against terrorist groups before they
strike.56
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration
was confronted with having to respond, more aggressively than ever
before, to the threat of international terrorism.57 Washington did not wait
long, however, before making it clear to the world that a new era of “anticipatory self-defense” had been ushered in, and that the United States
would follow this course of action in order to kill or capture terrorists
worldwide.58
President Bush further outlined this more aggressive, offensive approach
to counterterrorism in a speech to the 2002 graduating class at the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point:
Our security will require transforming the military you will lead—a
military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark
corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to
be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action
when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.59
Since that time, the United States has conducted innumerable global
counterterrorist operations, both successful and unsuccessful targeted
killings against such prominent terrorist figures as Osama bin Ladin and
Mullah Omar and their key lieutenants.60 So intent is the United States to
locate these individuals that it has included many on an official “wanted”
list, which offers multimillion dollar rewards for information leading to
their apprehension.61

Case Study: The Killing of al-Harithi
The most public example of targeted killing by the United States against
an individual terrorist occurred on November 3, 2002, when a Predator
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UAV, armed with Hellfire guided missiles, was used to attack a vehicle
in which the terrorist was traveling.62 The resulting explosion killed all
in the vehicle, including the suspected target, Abu Ali al-Harithi, an al
Qaeda leader and one of the terrorist network’s top figures in Yemen.
Officials in the United States still refused to admit responsibility for
the attack, though a significant amount of reporting indicates that the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated the drone. The day following the attack, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was asked if
the United States had been involved in the explosion. He did not identify
those responsible for the attack, though he did seem well aware of the
target.
The following exchange is insightful and is provided as an example of
the plausible deniability with which the United States and other nations
often approach public questions about incidents of targeted killing.63
Q: Mr. Secretary, what can you tell us about the car explosion that
was reported today in Yemen? Were any U.S. forces involved in that?
And have you learned anything about the aftermath of who was killed
in that event?
Rumsfeld: I’ve seen the reports. And the discussion in one of the
reports—I didn’t notice whose report it was, but it looked like a wire
service report of something out of the region—it said that Harithi
might be involved, in which case, as I recall, he was in fact one of the
people that is thought to have been involved with the USS Cole.
Q: Have you confirmed that through government sources?
Rumsfeld: No. I have not. And needless to say, he has been an individual that has been sought after as an al Qaeda member, as well as a
suspected terrorist connected to the USS Cole.64 So it would be a very
good thing if he were out of business.
It is clear that targeted killing has become an accepted American foreign
policy option, with a tacit rationale in self-defense. While this undoubtedly will result in questions about its legality and, perhaps more import
antly, the volatile issue of the U.S. military conduct of operations abroad,
there is little question that this practice will continue.
The policy of targeted killing, as adopted by the United States, has also
caused consternation among legal observers who feel that this method of
premeditated killing crosses the boundary set forth in Executive Order
12,333, which bans assassinations. However, it is clear that the United
19
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States justifies this approach as part of its “global war on terror,” and thus
applies the rules of war. Simply put, it argues that terrorists are not civilians, and are in fact enemy combatants, and are thus legitimate targets.
This assessment can be supported when considering that, as both terrorism and counterterrorism are forms of asymmetric—not conventional—
warfare, it is difficult to ascribe the same methodologies and judgments
that might have been present in World War II. For example, no longer is
the enemy wearing distinct uniforms, carrying their weapons openly, or
even obeying the spirit of the Geneva Convention.
Additionally, given that the “battlefield” is undefined and that a terrorist attack can occur anywhere, the armed interdiction of a terrorist must
sometimes necessarily occur in locations and at times not necessarily
preferred or chosen by the authorities. That targeted killings occur is, in
some cases, an act of necessity in order to prevent an imminent attack.
While this argument will be addressed in full later on in the text, it is sufficient here to note that the United States, like other nations, must necessarily reserve its right to self-defense, particularly against an asymmetric
threat such as terrorism.

State Study: Great Britain
Great Britain’s long history of involvement in Northern Ireland brought
with it innumerable challenges in attempting to combat the terrorist
threat. These challenges resulted in many changes to British law as it pertains to terrorism, as well as the adaptation of the security and military
forces to combat it on the ground. The inclusion of Great Britain in this
discussion also serves to highlight the difficulties inherent in justifying
targeted killing. Specifically, it clearly presents the challenges present
even in the face of what appears to be overwhelming evidence that a targeted killing was undertaken to stop terrorist actions immediately prior
to and, in fact, during their execution.
The Loughall case, which we will examine here, also highlights numerous
ancillary aspects of targeted killing, namely, the question of an unspoken policy (allegedly in place during the 1970s and 1980s) of “ambushing” IRA terrorists rather than attempting to effect their arrest, the
hazards of targeted killing and collateral damage, and the potential for
political backlash in the event of a questionable (or legally challenged)
interdiction.
In an effort to provide improved tactical guidance to its military forces in
Northern Ireland, the British government mandated the distribution of
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the “Yellow Card.” The Yellow Card was, quite literally that: a laminated
card to be carried at all times by British military personnel. On the card
were the official guidelines for the use of force by British soldiers.
Among the general rules were (selected rules provided verbatim):65
● Never use more force than the minimum necessary to enable you to
carry out your duties.
● If you have to challenge a person who is acting suspiciously you must
do so in a firm, distinct, voice saying “HALT—HANDS UP.”
● If the person does not halt at once, you are to challenge again saying
“HALT—HANDS UP” and, if the person does not halt on your second
challenge, you are to cock your weapon, apply the safety catch, and
shout, “STAND STILL I AM READY TO FIRE.”
Of course, the soldier could not simply engage any individual he wished,
Yellow Card or not. He had to have reasonable cause, such as the perception of a legitimate threat to himself or his fellow soldiers.
Mark Urban offers in his book Big Boys Rules that as the term “ambush”
was often used by officers briefing their men prior to a counterterrorist
operation, and that the Yellow Card was thus often disregarded, such is
evidenced in this interview between Urban and an SAS member:66
URBAN: What is the mission on an ambush?
SAS MAN: You know what the mission is on an ambush, everybody
knows what the mission is on an ambush.
URBAN: Tell me what you think it is.
SAS MAN: I know that when you do an ambush you kill people.

Case study: Loughall, Northern Ireland
In May 1987, British intelligence units began monitoring several wellknown and active IRA terrorists who were planning an attack against a
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) station in Loughall, Northern Ireland.67
In anticipation, both the SAS and police surveillance experts worked out
a coordinated effort to monitor the terrorists for days prior to the expected attack. Authorities also staked out the location where the explosives
to be used in the attack were located, a farmhouse located just kilometers
from the RUC station.
On the day of the planned bombing, the two terrorists were joined by six
other group members who approached the station in a van and a stolen
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tractor, to which had been affixed a massive 200-pound explosive device.
The terrorists planned to drive the tractor into the RUC compound and
detonate the device, thus leveling the station. After the attack, they would
steal any weapons in the station, then beat a hasty retreat.68
At least fifty armed military and police personnel (including additional
SAS personnel flown into Northern Ireland specifically for this action)
had taken up hidden positions around the area in order to interdict the
terrorists. In an interesting twist, the SAS also posted men inside the
station, despite the assessment that the station itself was the target. The
mission briefing described the operation as a “massive ambush.”69
Unaware of the presence of the authorities and the impending ambush,
the terrorists arrived, alighted their vehicle, and opened fire on the
station. At the same time, the tractor was driven up to the gate of the
compound, where the terrorists lit the fuse to detonate the device, which
exploded and partially destroyed the station. As they opened fire, however, the combined SAS/police force reacted, firing an estimate 1200
rounds at the gunmen.70 All IRA personnel were killed in the ensuing gun
battle, as was one civilian, who happened to be driving through the area
at the time of the ambush.
While it may be argued that this incident was a clear case of self-defense,
the European High Court in 1991 ruled against the United Kingdom, citing violations of the human rights of the eight dead terrorists.71 While the
court did not rule the shootings illegal, they did determine that the ensuing investigation conducted by the British government was in violation
due to what the court deemed “faulty effectiveness of investigation into
shooting.”72 This result demonstrates, again, the political risks states run
in conducting what may be a justifiable case of targeted killing.
Additionally, it appears that there can be no argument that the force sent
to interdict the terrorists in this case was intentionally placed in that
position not to arrest them, but rather to kill them. Had the authorities
wished to simply arrest the eight men, this could have been accomplished
in the days preceding the attack.73 Thus, despite denials by the British
military and legal challenges brought to the European High Court, the
Loughall incident appears to be a textbook case of targeted killing.

When Is Targeted Killing Justified?
While this paper avoids ascribing moral or ethical judgments to this
discussion of targeted killing, it is of value to examine the circumstances
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in which states can legitimately claim that the use of targeted killing is
within the norm of self-defense. In any offensive lethal action, there exist
any number of opportunities for accidents and abuse. As mentioned
earlier, there are no universally accepted laws governing the use of targeted killing. Each nation is responsible for applying its own domestic
laws and concepts of self-defense when considering this option. In the
absence of actual laws, therefore, it may be beneficial to examine a
hypothetical scenario in which targeted killing might be justified as selfdefense.
For example, if a terrorist were observed packing a vehicle with explosives, wiring the explosives to a handheld detonator, then driving that
vehicle toward a crowd of soldiers or a crowded marketplace (or a police
station, in the case of the Loughall incident described earlier), it seems
reasonable to assume that eliminating that terrorist would be justified.
In this case, it would appear that there could be little argument against
the idea that a terrorist who is in the process of carrying out a terrorist attack is a legitimate subject for targeted killing.74 The duty of a state
to protect its citizens from this threat is clear and unassailable, and the
terrorist’s death (assuming for the sake of argument that he could not be
captured alive) is a necessary outcome.
This example of a terrorist in action is the exception to the rule, of course.
Many times, targeted killings take place far from the scene of an attack,
both in time and place. For example, in the case of the U.S. targeted killing of al-Harithi, his detection and interdiction took place two years and
hundreds of miles away from the act for which the United States held him
accountable: the attack on the USS Cole. In this case, the United States
cited al-Harithi’s ongoing and active membership in al Qaeda as the basis
for his killing.
So, we can see that the dynamics of international terrorism severely test
the one truly effective countermeasure that is able to combat it: targeted
killing. Just as there is no universally accepted definition of the term,
there is equally no universally accepted norm under which its use is
permitted, even in what might seem the most direct cases of state selfdefense.
As mentioned previously, killings conducted for political reasons rather
than for direct security concerns are not targeted killings, but rather
assassinations. For example, as cited in the case of Israel’s elimination
of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, there are individuals whose elimination may
serve both purposes. The death of Yassin both eliminated a high-ranking
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politico-religious figure, and it may also have had a negative effect on
HAMAS’s ability to wage its terrorist campaign.
However, within the world of terrorism and insurgency, it is often difficult to differentiate between those participating in terrorism directly, and
those providing political, moral, or spiritual leadership. Very often, these
are intertwined. In these instances, nations can be expected to mold and
modify their explanations for a given killing to fit the circumstances (particularly to avoid either a domestic or international political backlash).
For example, Russia’s killing of senior Chechen military leaders may,
on one hand, be justified in that they are indeed in command of troops
in the field. On the other hand, they are also serving in senior political
positions. This dual responsibility often provides the aggressor state with
justification for eliminating political leaders under the pretext of eliminating a terrorist threat.

Targeted Killing at the Strategic, Operational, and
Tactical Levels
It is difficult to determine at what stages and with what results targeted
killing may be considered to have “worked.” The value placed on the success of such a mission is wholly dependent on the expected outcome. Do
the aggressors intend, with such a killing, to bring about the collapse of
a given group? Or, are the goals less grand, simply with the intention of
preventing a specific attack?
The answer may be more internalized, rooted in the motivations and
methodologies of the terrorist group itself. Does the group seek death as
part of its operational repertoire, or even as the means to an end, such
as in the case of martyrdom? Or, does it endeavor to keep its operatives
alive, so as to fight another day? There are three areas which must be
considered here in order to fully answer this question: strategic, operational, and tactical. These issues are critical when determining whether a
targeted killing can even possibly be considered successful.

Strategic
In answering the first series of questions, the preponderance of information leads to the conclusion that the targeted killing of senior leaders
or individuals does not lead to the dissolution or usually even a severe
degradation of that group’s capabilities or intentions. This is particularly
true in the case of those groups with long, established histories and large
or highly motivated memberships, or a wide support base (e.g., al Qaeda,
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC], or Spain’s ETA).
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These include terrorist groups, for example, that are seeking national
identity.75 Smaller groups, such as the Red Army Faction and the Red
Brigades survived the killing and imprisonment of key leaders and
continued operations for years.
To borrow a conclusion from senior RAND terrorism analyst Brian
Jenkins in his commentary in Newsday (December 3, 2003):
The more an enterprise draws from deep roots or has a broad base,
the less the effect of the death of its leader. It is not the loss of a
single leader that fells a movement, but the elimination of its leadership, operational capabilities, constituency and conditions.76
Additionally, the elimination (particularly the violent termination) of a
leader, who has gained a “mythic” status among his supporters, can serve
to demoralize a terrorist movement. As this mythic quality can often
serve as a force multiplier in a terrorist campaign, the elimination of this
element can have a strong impact. This is particularly true if the leader
has previously identified himself (or is perceived by followers) to be immune to capture or death at the hands of the enemy.
Yet, these considerations do not wholly limit the potential effectiveness
or applicability of targeted killing. It is likely that, less established, newly
founded groups may be more susceptible to such actions. This is an important consideration when states are confronted, for example, with the
phenomenon of splinter groups—smaller, usually more violent offshoots
of larger, more established (and oftentimes more politically reasonable)
terrorist groups. As such, splinter groups are inherently (as least in their
nascent stages) not as well supported as their parent body. They are more
vulnerable to eradication through the arrest or the killing of their ostensibly more radical leaders.
This is to say that such groups are ostensibly less well financed, less
well supported, and more reliant on an individual or a small group for
their moral guidance and operational viability. Thus, this critical node
of the splinter group is a key element (likely the essential element) in its
existence, the removal of which would likely result in its deformation and
eventually dissipation.
Another, possibly more important aspect of the debate surrounding
targeted killing is that it may serve as a viable tool in strategic efforts to
reduce terrorism. The difference here lies not in the target selection, per
se, but rather in the motivations and beliefs of the targeted group itself.
Within those terrorist groups whose goal is not martyrdom, but rather
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survival (e.g., IRA volunteers), the effects of targeted killing are much
different. While Islamic extremist terrorists may seek death as a way
to enter a desirable religious afterlife, and thus are not deterred by the
deaths of comrades by whatever means, this is not the case with many
secular groups, or groups that do not share a given belief system.
Thus, while targeted killing may not prove a disincentive to those former
groups, the reality is much different among groups who seek to survive
their attacks and “live to fight another day.” This difference may also
complicate the efforts of those groups seeking to survive and flourish in
the long run. For example, according to one former British SAS veteran
with 20 years’ experience in Northern Ireland and in other conflicts, the
killing of group members, particularly leaders, had a decisively negative
impact on future recruiting efforts.77 It is also possible that such elements
that may be present among secular terrorists, such as the quite understandable fear of being killed, may also prove a strong disincentive in the
face of a (either overt or covert) targeted killing campaign.

Operational
In an operational sense, the selective elimination of key personnel,
particularly those with critical skills (i.e., bomb makers, logisticians,
recruiters, financiers), is likely to have a detrimental effect on the short
to mid-term operations of any terrorist group. Certainly, the larger the
group, the less the impact, due to the probability of a group being able to
replace that individual—or to shift another, equally qualified individual
into the role of the displaced member.
Additionally, and particularly in the case of Islamic extremism, the
sheer volume of potential recruits greatly reduces the overall operational
impact of targeted killing. As the daily occurrence of suicide bombings in
nations around the world proves, despite the number of terrorists killed
in such attacks, the supply of candidates for the next day’s attacks appears limitless. This, too, affects not only the operational perspectives on
targeted killing, but that of its strategic questions as well. In an environment in which the targets are ostensibly perpetual, can targeted killing
truly have an impact to a significant enough level to justify its risks?
It may be argued that, when faced with a seemingly constant influx of
suicide volunteers, states must nonetheless act to interdict these individuals when and where they appear, to both interrupt the flow of new
recruits and to (ostensibly) preclude future attacks. The idea of inaction
against such a known threat is unthinkable in a modern state. Thus,
while targeted killing has only a limited impact on some terrorist groups,
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it is a necessary and logical tool for use in preventing future attacks.
Much like the multitude of hapless soldiers who swarmed up out of the
trenches into the face of machine gun fire in World War I, the enemy had
to be engaged, lest they overrun friendly forces and gain territory.
In fact, while this assessment is partly based on the author’s analysis, it
may be that targeted killing serves as an operational deterrent to terrorism. With the practice, at least as conducted by the United States and
Israel, well known to civilians and terrorists alike, it is possible and even
likely that this knowledge may force terrorists to operate in a more clandestine mode, thus hindering their operational capabilities, perhaps even
reducing the number of attacks.
In some cases, even the threat of targeted killing may be sufficient to
produce a positive result (i.e., the release of hostages). One example of
this occurred in June 1985, when Shiite terrorists hijacked a TWA flight
en route from Athens to Rome. The plane was then diverted to Beirut,
Lebanon. There, the terrorists tortured several passengers, eventually
executing one U.S. Navy diver and tossing his body onto the tarmac, in
plain sight of international news crews.
In the days that followed, the terrorists removed the hostages from the
plane and dispersed them throughout Beirut, in an effort to complicate
any possible armed rescue attempt.
According to an account by former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu in Fighting Terrorism, the office of the U.S. Secretary of State
asked his advice as to how they should proceed. Netanyahu responded:
“ ‘Issue a counter-threat,’ I told him. ‘Make it clear to the terrorists that if
they so much as touch a hair on any of the hostages’ heads, you won’t rest
until every last one of them has been hunted down and wiped out.’ ”78
The Secretary’s office later reported back to Netanyahu that they had
acted on his advice and the results had been positive. A few weeks later,
all the hostages were released unharmed. While this release was due, in
part, to a previously negotiated settlement unrelated to the hijacking and
subsequent kidnapping, it is possible that the counter-threat of targeted
killing achieved its desired result.
Another, slightly different, example of this potential by-product of targeted killing occurred in December 1975 when two IRA terrorists, quite
literally on the run from authorities, barged into an occupied apartment
and took two civilian hostages. The incident ended on the sixth day when
authorities announced that an SAS team had arrived on scene and was
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prepared to storm the apartment.79 In this case, the perceived threat to
their lives presented by the presence of the SAS was enough to cause the
terrorists to surrender.
It is important to note—there is no evidence to indicate that the intentions of the SAS team at the scene were in any way related to a predetermined course of targeted killing. It must be noted, however, that the
reputation of the SAS as feared, ruthless killers was widely believed
throughout the United Kingdom, and particularly in Northern Ireland.
This mythology would play itself out over the next decade, when the SAS
killed at least 28 IRA members in various confrontations.80
Despite these potential and actual benefits, it must be noted that attempting to reduce a group’s operational capabilities through targeted
killing is of limited utility when posed against groups practicing advanced
security measures. In Inside Al Qaeda, author Rohan Gunaratna identifies one crucial aspect:
To ensure al Qaeda’s operational effectiveness, the group stresses the
need to maintain internal security, dividing its operatives into overt
and covert members functioning under a single leader…al Qaeda’s
global network has survived by its members strictly adhering to the
principles of operational security.81
The continued “success” of al Qaeda (measured in its ability to conduct
major terrorist attacks worldwide despite international efforts to eradicate it) is a testament to its members’ adherence to operational security.
More importantly, for purposes of this discussion, this ongoing viability
is evidence of the ineffectiveness of targeted killing (as practiced by the
U.S. in this case) in providing a significant detriment to the group’s operational capabilities.82

Tactical
Targeted killing may be said to “work” in its most obvious sense when
it directly results in the thwarting of an imminent terrorist attack; the
surveillance and interdiction of known, armed terrorists en route to an
airport, or driving a truck laden with explosives toward a city centre,
or even a lone, armed terrorist entering a subway system. All of these
would likely be considered justifiable killings, and would most certainly
be examples (if successfully interdicted) of the effective use of targeted
killing. In this, its most elemental form, is found its most immediate and
appropriate function.
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One example is the SAS killing of three IRA terrorists in Gibraltar in
1988. While this case is an ongoing matter of debate as to whether the
SAS soldiers involved intended to kill the IRA terrorists, this provides a
concrete example of the efficacy of surveilling and intentionally engaging
named terrorists known to be planning an imminent attack.
In early 1988, three known IRA terrorists traveled to Gibraltar with the
purpose of planting a large explosive device in a car to target British
soldiers during a changing of the guard ceremony at the governor’s residence.83 The SAS team was warned that the device might be detonated
by a remote control in the hands of one of the terrorists. To prevent this,
British and Spanish intelligence services cooperated in their efforts to
surveil the trio as they traveled from Ireland to Gibraltar.
On the afternoon of March 6, a small SAS team confronted the three and,
in the ensuing melee, shot all three dead. The resultant investigation
(mandatory in cases of the military’s use of lethal force outside a combat
zone) revealed that the IRA members were all armed, though there was
no bomb in the car (the device was later located in a neighboring town),
and the killings were declared legal following a military tribunal. No
bystanders and none of the SAS personnel were injured.
Clearly, the actions of the SAS in this case thwarted an imminent attack
that almost certainly would have killed and injured numerous British
soldiers and visiting tourists. This case, if in fact the order was given to
kill the individuals, served to prevent an atrocity that would otherwise
have taken place. Thus, in this sense, we have strong indicators that
targeted killing can indeed serve as a lawful and proactive measure in
combating terrorism.
On the tactical level, targeted killing has its most obvious application:
stopping a terrorist before he has the opportunity to conduct an imminent attack. A sovereign state has the duty to act to protect its citizenry,
and in cases where a clear and present danger exists, such as in the case
of an imminent terrorist attack, targeted killing becomes a more viable
option than perhaps in the preceding two categories.

When Does Targeted Killing “Fail”
As we have seen, targeted killing can have a beneficial impact on several
levels for those states waging counterterrorist campaigns. However, it
is equally important to analyze the numerous ways in which a policy of
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targeted killing can backfire and create a host of unforeseen problems
for states that engage in this type of action. Among the most important
potential weaknesses of targeted killing are the possibilities of collateral
damage, creating martyrs, the failure to exploit potential terrorist resources through capture rather than killing, and the possibility of negative international political repercussions.

Collateral Damage
One issue to be considered is clearly that of “collateral damage”—more
specifically, the potential for loss of life among innocent bystanders at the
scene of an attack. While the killing of an innocent person directly (such
as the Mossad’s failed operation in Lillehammer) is indeed quite rare, the
nature of terrorists, operating not from fixed bases but rather in virtually
any environment, increases the likelihood of civilian exposure.84 The
potential risk is posed to those who may happen to be walking by a booby-trapped vehicle, sitting in an outdoor café next to a wanted t errorist,
or merely sauntering down a city street as a missile attack is launched
from a nearby helicopter.
Some notable recent examples include the following:
Date

Target

Method

May 30,
2004

Wael Nassar, head
of Izzedine al
Qassam, Hamas’
military wing

Airstrike,
Target and
Israeli Air Force bodyguard killed;
one civilian killed85

March 22,
2004

Sheikh Ahmed
Yassin

Airstrike,
Target killed; six
Israeli Air Force bystanders killed,
numerous
injured86

June 10,
2003

Abdel Aziz Rantisi, Airstrike,
Target escaped; six
Leader of GazaIsraeli Air Force civilians killed87
based HAMAS unit

July 23,
2002

Salah al-Shahada,
Hamas military
leader

Airstrike,
Target killed; 14
Israeli Air Force civilians killed, 140
injured88

October 7,
2001

Mullah Omar,
Taliban leader

Airstrike, U.S.
Air Force

November
9, 2000

Hussein Abayat,
Fatah member

Airstrike,
Target killed; two
Israeli Air Force civilians killed90
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There are innumerable other examples like these, though usually involving lower-ranking terrorists. The fallout from collateral damage continues to plague targeted killing operations and draws greater attention to
the potential for innocent loss of life. For example, on July 15, 2005, the
Israeli Air Force launched a missile attack against a van as it transited a
street in Gaza City, killing four HAMAS terrorists, including the bodyguard of a high-ranking group member.91 The van contained a cache of
homemade rockets and explosives, which subsequently detonated,
sending shards of fragmentation hundreds of yards in all directions.92
No bystanders were reported killed or injured, but given the nature of the
cargo and the location of the van on a city street, the potential for such
casualties was obvious.
The potential risk of injuring or killing bystanders, then, is clear due in
no small measure to the elusive nature of the target and the terrorist’s
proclivity for operating in urban areas or locations otherwise crowded
with civilians. Unless the preoperational intelligence is fully accurate and
can verify that there are no explosives or other potentially lethal items in
the possession of the terrorist, there can be no way to predict the outcome of a violent encounter. Even in the absence of the use of a vehicle,
the chaotic results of a missile strike or a booby-trapped car bomb cannot
be accurately and definitively predicted. In these and other scenarios,
civilians are often inadvertently placed in harm’s way due to the dynamic
nature of hunting down and killing terrorists, whatever their location.

The Martyrdom Effect
Another potential downside to targeted killing is what, for the purposes
of this discussion, is termed the “martyrdom effect.” This well-known
dynamic occurs when a terrorist, particularly one held in high esteem by
group members and followers, is killed at the hands of security forces.
This can result in the perceptual uplifting of that terrorist to near mythic
status, thus inspiring followers to avenge the killing, and thereby fostering an ongoing cycle of violence. While the subject of martyrdom is
sufficiently vast to fill tomes, it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully
address this phenomenon. Its impact on targeted killing, however, necessitates a cursory discussion here.
As detailed earlier, even if the killing does not result in retributive
attacks, it can also serve to increase (not decrease) the morale of a given
group. Such events are frequently witnessed following the death of a
senior group member and the ensuing mass funeral marches common
throughout the Middle East. Billboards throughout the Gaza Strip and
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elsewhere, for example, extol the sacrifice and bravery of suicide bombers
and other terrorists who have met violent ends.
Such is the nature of terrorism today, particularly Islamic extremist
terrorism, whereby martyrdom has become not just a by-product of a
terrorist act, but per se a primary motivation for that act in itself.93 This
phenomenon is unlike the Irish hunger strikers of the 1970s or any of
the deaths of secular terrorists in action where martyrdom was not the
primary motivation for individual involvement in an action resulting in
death. Such was the case with the IRA’s Bobby Sands (a hunger striker
whose death caused a major outpouring of sympathy and support within
the Northern Ireland Republican community and elsewhere). In some
cases these deaths did indeed result in their elevation to what may only
be described as martyr status.
Thus, we can see that there is an important difference between the “martyrdom” of a secular terrorist (which arises primarily from respect and
acknowledgment of sacrifice for a given action) and that of a religious
terrorist (whose martyrdom is accepted as the final reward of his actions
from a higher power). That difference is that the secular terrorist desires
to live beyond the attack cycle, while the religious terrorist seeks and
expects his death as part of the attack itself.

Killing versus Capture
Another factor that must be considered is that of the choice made by
states to kill rather than capture a known terrorist. In the short term,
particularly in instances of an expected imminent attack, targeted killing may be unavoidable to prevent the loss of innocent life. However, in
those cases in which a terrorist or terrorists are monitored for long
periods of time and do not appear to be involved in a near-term attack,
their killing may not only be unnecessary but might also eliminate a
potentially valuable source of intelligence.
A good example of this was the arrest of senior al Qaeda planner
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (aka KSM) in March 2003 by Pakistani police
officers. It is clear from the evidence that these forces could easily have
killed KSM, had they chosen to do so. Instead, recognizing the potentially
vast amount of intelligence they could gather from him regarding previous and future planning for terrorist attacks, they opted to arrest rather
than kill him. The resulting interrogations revealed valuable insight into
al Qaeda and their global network and operations.94
Information gleaned from the interrogation of captured terrorists can
result in the capture or killing of higher-ranking group leaders, the
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disruption of attack planning, interdiction of lines of communication,
and a host of other related benefits.95 Therefore, while the targeted killing of a terrorist may seem the most expedient course of action in some
cases, it is clear that the termination of a person who may hold valuable
information (potentially far out of proportion to his own value within an
organization) could prove counterproductive when considering the prosecution of a long-term counterterrorist campaign.

Political Repercussions
The last element considered in this section is the potential for negative political repercussions. While states commonly reserve the right
to self-defense, the unique nature of terrorism (namely, the likelihood
that wanted terrorists may flee beyond the borders of the state) can
sometimes mandate that states consider conducting operations outside their own sovereign territory. Due to the potential for overwhelming political fallout, not to mention the possibility of inciting a wider
conflict with a neighbor, it is rare that a state will risk authorizing such
operations.
Following Israel’s killing of Sheikh Yassin, France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom vociferously condemned the attack.96 Of the major
world powers, only the United States refused to condemn the attack,
citing Yassin’s involvement with terrorism and Israel’s “right to selfdefense.”97 Prominent non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty
International, also condemned the attack, stating that, “once again Israel
has chosen to violate international law instead of using alternative lawful
means” and that “the assassination of Sheikh Yassin is likely to further
escalate the spiral of violence.”98
To further compound Israel’s public “black eye,” the Algerian government on March 23, one day after the attack, sponsored a draft resolution
in the UNSC condemning Israel for its actions. Eleven members of the
UNSC voted in favor, three abstained, though the United States ultimately quashed the resolution by exercising its veto powers.99,100 This did not
preclude UN Secretary General Kofi Annan from publicly condemning
the attack: “Such actions are not only contrary to international law, but
they do not do anything to help the search for a peaceful solution.”101
Clearly, such overt targeted killings do not go unnoticed on the world
stage. States must be willing to risk the most severe forms of international condemnation (e.g., UN resolutions, the possible risk of treaty pullouts, economic sanctions) should they choose to pursue targeted killing
as a tool in their counterterrorism arsenals.
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Case Study: The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Israeli
Response
Perhaps the most notable example of a targeted killing campaign
that resulted in negative international repercussions was conducted by
Israel following the 1972 Munich Olympics. This case study provides
an example of the potentially disastrous consequences when states
partake in unilateral actions (particularly prolonged actions) against
perceived or known individual terrorist threats. While a detailed
examination of the Black September operation and the complex events
surrounding it are beyond the scope of this paper, the relevance of
this particular event merits special attention here, and for that reason,
will be discussed in greater detail than in the previously outlined case
studies.
In September 1972, a team of eight heavily armed terrorists from the proPalestinian group Black September attacked an apartment block housing Israeli athletes in Munich, Germany.102 In the resulting action, the
terrorists killed two athletes outright, and took nine hostages. Protracted
negotiations ensued, involving representatives from numerous countries,
including Egypt, Germany, and Israel. During this time, the entire event
was televised worldwide to an audience of hundreds of millions—thus
granting the terrorists the audience they so greatly desired.
These negotiations resulted in an agreement by which the terrorists
would be granted safe passage out of Germany. However, upon arrival
at the airport, German police opened fire. In the ensuing gun battle, all
Israeli hostages, five of the eight terrorists, and one German policeman
were killed. Three of the terrorists were taken into custody, though soon
released, when Palestinian terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa flight and
demanded their safe return of their imprisoned comrades.103
In the aftermath of the attack, senior Israeli officials (including Prime
Minister Golda Meir) decided to form a covert action team to track down
and kill those individuals who participated and planned the operation.
The team was given permission to operate worldwide in its efforts to
fulfill its mission. The operatives were selected from both the military
special forces and intelligence (Mossad) communities and hand picked
for their ability to operate covertly and their willingness to undertake
missions resulting in the targeted killing of their prey. Among these were
personnel from the elite Sayeret Matkal counterterrorism unit, equivalent in the West to Great Britain’s SAS and Russia’s Spetznaz (“spetsialnoye nazranie,” or “special purpose troops”).
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It is indeed rare for a state to sanction official targeted killing teams with
a global mission. It is rarer still for this sanction to come from the highest level of a state government.104 Such was the sentiment in Israel at the
time, the public bursting with outrage over the atrocity, that Meir recognized that the actions of Black September could not go unanswered. “We
will smite them wherever they may be,” she stated in an address to the
Knesset soon after the attack.105
In the months that followed, the Israeli team hunted down and killed
numerous members of Black September around the world, in Lebanon,
Italy, and France. It was in Norway, however, that the Israeli operation
unraveled. In the mistaken belief that it had tracked down one of its most
wanted terrorists, Ali Hassan Salameh, a small team of Mossad operators
gunned down an individual on a public street in Lillehammer, Norway.
The dead man turned out not to be Salameh, but rather Ahmed Bouchiki,
a Moroccan waiter who was returning from a cinema with his pregnant
wife. Simon Reeve, in One Day in September, describes the shooting and
the events that followed as “one of the greatest disasters in the history of
the Mossad.”106
Norwegian authorities soon arrested many of the team who had participated in the incident, some of whom were later sentenced to prison
terms. Their confessions led to arrests in France, a public trial in Norway,
and worse for the leadership in Tel Aviv, exposure of Israel’s blatant disregard for national borders and outrage at conducting an illegal targeted
killing on foreign soil.
In the end, the retaliatory missions launched by Israel did eventually
result in the deaths of most Black September terrorists involved in the
Munich massacre; the killings were conducted in secrecy and with
plausible deniability to distance Israel from the actions. However, the
Lillehammer disaster not only exposed Israel’s secret intelligence
network to public scrutiny, but more importantly prompted deteriora
tion in its international prestige, leading to significant political
fallout.

Conclusions
Targeted killing has always been and will remain a double-edged sword.
While states may need or choose to eliminate known or perceived threats
posed by individuals, the risks, as stated previously, can be immense.
There are a number of important conclusions we can draw from the
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arguments and case studies cited in this paper. First, the practice of
targeted killing will continue into the foreseeable future, with states
prepared to risk political capital and collateral damage in order to
enforce their perceptions of self-defense. Second, this practice will
remain controversial in the legal battlefields of the UN, The Hague, and
in other centers of international legal order and debate. It remains for
each individual state to decide if the risks of targeted killing are worth the
rewards.
On a more practical level, however, it appears that targeted killing, as
a tool of counterterrorism, is a weapon of only limited strategic utility.
There is little evidence to indicate that the killing of a specific individual,
no matter how high ranking, will have a lasting impact on that group’s
ability and willingness to continue to wage a terrorist campaign. This
is particularly true for those groups with widely shared ideologies and
characteristics, long operational histories, and a wide member and
support bases. Conversely, it must be stated, targeted killing may be
more effective when employed against smaller groups or those less well
established and more reliant on a single leader or leaders for their
ongoing operations.
Targeted killing does, on the other hand, offer states a method of dealing
tactical and operational blows against terrorist targets. This is particularly true in the case of interdicting terrorists known to be preparing or
undertaking an imminent terrorist attack. Additionally, the elimination
of terrorists who contribute specific and hard-to-replace skills may also
impact groups in the short to medium term.
At best, the results of state campaigns of targeted killing have been
mixed. In some cases, it is certain that the elimination of individuals
has prevented pending and future attacks. In other cases, this tool
appears to have been used in a preventative sense—eliminating individuals involved with terrorism (e.g., the SAS ambush at Loughall), but with
no evidence to indicate that they represent a clear and present threat
(Sheik Yassin).
Clearly, terrorism presents states with security challenges that differ
greatly from those posed by conventional warfare. States have been
forced to adapt to these challenges. This has involved the modification of
existing laws, the creation of new laws, the development and deployment
of specialized military and security units, as well as new technologies
designed to assist these forces. Equally as controversial as some of these
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adaptations has been the adoption of contentious and politically risky
policies that hinge on the already debatable concepts of anticipatory selfdefense and preemption.
As we have seen, the majority of states have not chosen to appeal to the
UN for justification in defending themselves from terrorism (at least not
on a case by case basis, and certainly not in terms of seeking permission)
in those cases in which targeted killing was applied. States have, instead,
chosen to allow vague guidelines, such as citing Article 51, to justify their
offensive counterterrorist campaigns. This vagueness permits states to
operate in a grey world in which they are able to cross national boundaries, both in terms of sovereign borders and international agreements. In
the final analysis, it is interesting to note that Israel, the most prolific and
experienced practitioner of targeted killing, is the only state known to
have made an official effort to set out the conditions in which its military
may conduct such operations.107
However, as already noted, the ongoing terrorist quest for methods
of attack that will cause mass casualties may alter the landscape on
which we have to date viewed targeted killing. So to many, the fear of
terrorists flying a jetliner into a nuclear power plant or chemical farm
causes justifiable concern. As the potential risk of massive loss of life at
the hands of even one terrorist becomes more realistic, it is likely that
states will adopt more flexible approaches to self-defense. Targeted killing, still considered an internationally debatable method of preemptive
action, may become less of an ill-thought of arm of counterterrorism,
and more valued as a potentially efficient and effective method of selfdefense.
Inevitably, states will still have to consider the immeasurable and innumerable possible consequences of embarking on even a single targeted
killing operation due to the reasons cited earlier, namely the potential
for collateral damage, martyrdom, and political fallout. It is this debate—
the risk versus the reward—that states will have to consider as they seek
new and potentially controversial methods to defend themselves from
the specter of terrorism or opt to continue their agenda of targeted
killing.
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Appendix A
Selected International Incidents of Targeted Killing: 1973–2004
Primary
Target(s)

Method

Location

Perpe
trator108

April 17,
2004

Abd al-Aziz
al-Rantisi,
successor to
Sheikh Yassin

IAF Apache
helicopter
using guided
missiles

Gaza City

Israel109

Target
killed

March 22,
2004

Sheikh Ahmed
Yassin,
HAMAS spiritual leader

IAF Apache
helicopter
using guided
missiles

Gaza City

Israel110

Target
killed,
seven
others
killed,
more
than 20
injured

February
13, 2004

Zelimkhan
Yanderbiyev,
former Chechen president

Boobytrapped car

Qatar

Russia111

Target
killed,
along with
two bodyguards

November
3, 2002

Qaed Senyan
al-Harithi, al
Qaeda senior
operative

U.S. Predator drone,
equipped
with guided
missiles

Yemen

United
States112

Target
killed,
along with
five passengers

March 19,
2002

Chechen warlord Omar Ibn
al-Khattab

Letter
impregnated
with unidentified poison

Chechnya

Russia,
via
Federal
Security
Service
(FSB)113

Target
killed

October 18, Atef Abayat,
2001
senior member of al-Aqsa
Martyrs’ Brigade

Boobytrapped car

Israel,
near Bethlehem

Israel114

Target
killed,
along with
two passengers

April 21,
1996

Guided
missile115

Chechnya

Russia116

Target
killed

Date
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Date

Primary
Target(s)

Method

Location

Perpe
trator108

Result

March 7,
1988

Three
members of
the IRA

Small arms

Gibraltar,
UK

UK, via
Special
Air
Service
(SAS)117

All three
targets
killed

May 8,
1987

Eight
members of
the IRA

Small arms

Loughall,
Northern
Ireland

UK, via
Special
Air
Service
(SAS)118

All eight
targets
killed

April 10,
1973

Yusuf alClandestine
Najjar, head of commando
operations
Fatah intelligence arm;

Beirut,
Lebanon

Israel119

All targets
killed

Endnotes
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6 Despite the modern acceptance that the term “assassin” was derived from the
Ismaili sect as cited previously, the author would like to note that there is considerable modern debate as to the legitimacy of assigning the heritage of the term
“assassin” to the Ismaili sect. The primary argument against this is well summarized by Farhad Daftary in The Assassin Legends: Myths of the Isma’ilis (London:
I.B. Tauris, 1994). In this work, Daftary attributes the misnomer to a convoluted
progression of misunderstanding and mistranslation. According to Daftary, “The
western tradition of calling the Nizari Isma’ilis by the name of Assassins can be
traced to the Crusaders and their Latin chroniclers as well as other occidental
observers…the name, or more appropriately misnomer, Assassin, which was
originally derived under obscure circumstances from variants of the word hashish,
the Arabic name for a narcotic product, and which later became the common
occidental term for designating the Nizari Isma’ilis, soon acquired a new meaning
in European languages; it was adopted as a common noun meaning murderer.”
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 While a complete understanding of this new look into the origins of the term
assassin is beyond the scope of this paper, the author wishes to acknowledge the
ongoing debate as to the proper assignation of the term.
7	The author acknowledges here that the caveat of asymmetric warfare, versus
conventional warfare, is essential. In large part, historic kingdoms and states were
largely threatened only by parties of roughly equal size and makeup. This is to say,
more simply, the primary method of warfare has been state versus state rather
than today’s more ambiguous threats from individuals and small groups. Therefore, the concept of self-defense was one thought of primarily in those terms (see
the cited example of Israel prior to the Six Day War). It is for this reason, clearly,
that the concept of targeted killing has only recently entered the lexicon and arena
of academic and political discussion.
8	As cited by Steven R. David in his paper “Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” in
Ethics and International Affairs: 2003 (Vol. 17, No. 1), “there is no established
norm against targeted killing, but there is against assassination.” (pg. 115). Mr.
David provides an excellent assessment of this differentiation in this paper as well
(see pgs. 112–116).
9 Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), pgs. 47–85.
10	The specific prohibition on assassination is found in Executive Order 12333, Parts
2.11 and 2.12. The verbatim text demonstrates the clear guidance: “2.11 Prohibition on assassination. No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United
States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination. 2.12
Indirect participation. No agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate
in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this order.” Notable,
for purposes of this discussion, is the lack of any definition of assassination in EO
12333, which, it could be argued, leaves the legal guidance vague enough to make
targeted killing a viable tool of statecraft. See http://www.tinyurl.com/cqydm
(http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/eo12333.html)
11	In 1970, the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations
released its report entitled “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders.” This report concluded that the United States was involved in the killings
of foreign political leaders, and took part in plans for further such killings. Individuals cited as actual or potential targets included Cuban President Fidel Castro,
Dominican leader Rafael Trujillo, and South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh
Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. See Alleged Assassination Plots Involving
Foreign Leaders (Amsterdam: Fredonia Books, 2001). This document can also be
found online in numerous locations, including http://www.tinyurl.com/c8fozo
(http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/ir/contents.htm).
12	The author was able to discover at least one U.S. military paper that recommended
that selective assassination should be further studied as a possible option for
the U.S. government. See “Selective Assassination as an Instrument of National
Policy,” (Washington: Loompanics Unlimited, 1990). The author of this study was
described as a U.S. Air Force captain, though his name and the ultimate purpose of
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this study remain unknown. It is the author’s opinion that this study was the result
of an academic program, possibly undertaken at one of the national war colleges.
13 David Rodin, War & Self-Defense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pg. 189.
14	Rodin, pg. 190.
15	In August 1998, the Clinton Administration authorized cruise missile strikes
against a number of targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. These strikes were carried
out partly in retaliation for the earlier terrorist suicide bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The president later stated that there was “compelling
information they were planning additional terrorist attacks against our citizens
and others with the inevitable collateral casualties and … seeking to acquire
chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons.” http://www.tinyurl.com/r9pl
(http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.01/)
16 http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm
17	The author acknowledges here that, in the case of self-defense, states are more
likely to act without deferring to the UNSC based on their perception that the
threat posed against them is of sufficient concern. This is to say that states will act
to ensure their survival, rather than defer to any international body for approval
on a course of action.
18	Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed
Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pgs. 97–108.
19	Eric Hammel, Six Days in June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War
(New York: ibooks, inc., 1992), pgs.165–171.
20	The evidence which led Israel to war included reconnaissance of enemy positions,
observations of troop buildups, belligerent talk from enemy leaders (most notably
Egyptian president Gamal Nasser), and other obvious indicators. Perhaps most
important and provocative among these, however, was the closure of the Straits of
Tiran, which effectively blockaded the politically important Israeli port of Eilat—
one of the primary reasons Israel went to war with Egypt in 1956. See Hammel,
pgs. 33–37 and 40–42.
21	UN Security Council Resolution 487 (1981). http://www.tinyurl.com/c58okx
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/418/74/IMG/
NR041874.pdf?OpenElement)
22	A/RES/37/18, November 18, 1982, http://www.tinyurl.com/djhsj5 (http://www
.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r018.htm)
23	Franck, pg. 96.
24	A review of the historical literature reveals many discussions and instances of
senior military officers refusing to consider the targeted killing of their counterparts in battle. For example, according to one interesting anecdote, the following exchange took place between the Duke of Wellington and a nearby English
artilleryman. Upon seeing French general Napoleon Bonaparte across the field
of battle, the artilleryman exclaimed, “There’s Bonaparte, sir. I think I can reach
him. May I fire?” The Duke, aghast at the suggestion, replied, “No, no. Generals
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commanding armies have something else to do than shoot at one another.” See
Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword (New York: Harper and
Row, 1969), pg. 472.
25	Geoffrey Bennett, The Battle of Trafalgar (Great Britain: Pen & Sword Military
Classics, 2004), pgs 205–210.
26 Whether Admiral Lord Nelson was intentionally singled out as a target prior to or
during the battle of Trafalgar is a matter of ongoing debate, though it appears that
he may have been targeted once identified by the enemy. According to one account,
found in the memoirs of a French sharpshooter who claimed to have fired the fatal
shot, “On the poop (deck) of the English vessel was an officer covered with orders
and with only one arm. From what I had heard of Nelson, I had no doubt that it
was he.” See Geoffrey Bennett, The Battle of Trafalgar (Great Britain: Pen & Sword
Military Classics, 2004), pg.206. The author could find no credible evidence that
the French had given orders for the purposeful killing of Nelson prior to the engagement and his death appears to have been the legitimate outcome of open warfare at
sea. It should also be noted that at least one modern study of Trafalgar concluded
that Nelson was killed by a stray or ricocheted bullet. See Roy Adkins, Trafalgar:
The Biography of a Battle (Great Britain: Little, Brown, 2004), pg. 206.
27	For an excellent accounting of the failed British attempt to kill Rommel, see
Michael Asher, Get Rommel: The Secret British Mission to Kill Hitler’s Greatest
General (London: The Orion Publishing Group Ltd., 2004).
28	For a detailed accounting of this operation, the author recommends Callum
MacDonald, The Killing of SS Obergurppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich (London:
Macmillan, 1990).
29 Mike Ryan, Special Operations in Iraq (Great Britain: Pen & Sword Military,
2004), pgs. 42–46.
30	There is some debate as to whether President Roosevelt himself approved the
ambush, though at least two authors have cited messages obtained during their
research that appear to verify this claim. It is clear, however, that senior U.S.
military commanders approved this mission, to include Admiral Chester Nimitz,
commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. See, for example, Carroll V. Glines,
Attack on Yamamoto (New York: Orion Books, 1990), pgs. 1–12.
31 See Article 37 as found in the “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol 1 Adopted on June 8, 1977 by the Diplomatic Conference on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in
Armed Conflicts.” http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/93.htm
32 While the perpetrators were not military personnel, but rather that of an Allied
intelligence agency, they were under the operational control of the British military
and, as such, their conduct was clearly in violation of the Geneva Convention
protocols against the use of perfidy.
33 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1202273,00.html and
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-04/24/content_325957.htm
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34 1	The incident referred to here occurred on April 5, 1986 when terrorists detonated
a two-kilogram improvised explosive device (IED). The resulting blast and fire
killed two U.S. servicemen and a Turkish woman and was subsequently
cited as the tripwire that brought about Operation El Dorado Canyon.
http://www.tinyurl.com/danoa (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/
1653848.stm)
35 David B. Cohen, “Revisiting El Dorado Canyon,” White House Studies, Spring
2005, p. 21.
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KVD/is_2_5/ai_n16107461/pg_21
36 http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/20/libya.sanctions/
37 See, for example, Major Ralph J. Jodice III, USAF, “El Dorado Canyon: Strategic
Strike, National Objectives,” Command and Staff College, 1990; and Walter Boyne,
“El Dorado Canyon,” Air Force: Journal of the Air Force Association, March 1999,
Vol. 82, No. 3.
38	A “dirty bomb” is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite or semtex, with radioactive
powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off, the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. A dirty bomb cannot create an
atomic blast, but rather works by disseminating radiological material throughout a
given area.
39	The U.S.-based Centers for Disease Control (CDC) provide an exhaustive list of
such agents, including detailed information on many biological agents that maybe
used by terrorists. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp
40 http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlistchem-category.asp
41 Walter Laquer, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pg. 4.
42 See, for example, U.S. Congressional Research Service report “Nuclear
Power Plants: Vulnerability to Terrorist Attack,” dated February 4, 2005.
http://www.tinyurl.com/cfqv7a (http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21131.pdf)
43	In 1986, RAND analyst Bruce Hoffman released an unclassified report entitled
“Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities”
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1986) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy. This
report highlighted many of the same concerns that confronted security officials in
the months following 9/11.
44	For the purposes of this paper, antiterrorism reflects more passive measures such
as education, surveillance, liaison training, and advising; counterterrorism refers
to offensive measures to prevent and deter terrorism with active interdiction such
as targeting and elimination.
45	It should be noted that some deaths involving Palestinian militants, while
appearing to be the work of the Israeli government, are sometimes perpetrated
by dissident or warring internal factions of the Palestinian liberation
movement.
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46	For further information on Israeli assassination and targeting killing involving the
Mossad and other special units, see Gordon Thomas, Gideon’s Spies: The Secret
History of the Mossad (Thomas Dune Press, 1999) and Alexander Calahan, “Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and
the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams” (Marine Corps Command
and General Staff College, April 1995).
47	Thomas B. Hunter, “The Other SAS: The CIA’s Special Activities Staff,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, June 1999, pgs. 52–54.
48	This debate is highlighted in Ethics and International Affairs: 2003, Vol. 17,
No. 1. Papers of interest in this volume include Steven R. David, “Israel’s Policy
of Targeted Killing,” (pgs.111–126) and the response to this paper by Yael Stein,
“By Any Name Illegal and Immoral,” (pgs. 127–139). The author also recommends
the critical discussion of the Israeli policy by Michael L. Gross, “Fighting by Other
Means in the Mideast: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Assassination Policy,” Political
Studies: 2003, Vol. 51, pgs. 350–368.
49	Amos Harel and Gideon Alon, “IDF Lawyers Set ‘Conditions’ For Assassination
Policy,” February 4, 2002. http://www.tinyurl.com/dxl28p (http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo = 125404)
50	Richard Sale, “Israel to Kill in U.S., Allied Nations,” UPI.com,
http://www.tinyurl.com/dlfj3u (http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID =
20030115-035849-6156r)
51	The most notable case involving Israeli targeted killings across international
borders occurred after the massacre of Israeli athletes in Munich during the 1972
Olympic Games. In the days following the attack, the Israeli government met
secretly to decide on a course of action to respond to these events. The conclusion
of this meeting led to a covert campaign to track down and kill each member of
the Black September Organization responsible for planning or participating in the
attack. The ensuing campaign led the Mossad hit team to various countries around
the world in their pursuit, to include the accidental killing of a civilian in Norway
(for which the agents were arrested). In this case, it can be argued that Israel was
pursuing an act of self-defense, in eliminating individuals known to have taken
part in the planning or execution of terrorist activities against the state. However,
it is also reasonable to assume that Israel had ulterior motives in its action: intimidation and revenge. The subsequent hunt for and killing of the Munich Olympics
terrorists no doubt caused those who had played a part in the massacre to feel
their own sense of terror, in that they had become the hunted rather than the
hunter. It also demonstrated to the world that Israel was willing to cross borders
and patiently seek out anyone who it felt represented a terrorist threat to the state,
though this did ultimately, have negative international repercussions.
52 http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/rosenberg200403221459.asp
53 http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/2004/yassin_032204.asp
54	CNN.com, “Source: Israel to end targeted killings,” February 4, 2005.
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/03/mideast/
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55 Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the
International Terrorist Network (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001),
pgs. 67–68.
56 Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar,
Strausand Giroux, 1986), pgs. 16–17.
57	This should not be construed to mean that the United States has never envisioned
a preemptive policy against terrorism. Benjamin Netanyahu, in his book Fighting Terrorism (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001) that then-Secretary
of State George Shultz stated at a conference on counterterrorism that, “It is time
to think long, hard, and seriously about amore active means of defense—defense
through appropriate preventive or preemptive actions against terrorist groups
before they strike.” (pg. 69)
58	For an in-depth analysis of U.S. foreign policy under the Bush Administration, see
Betty Glad and Chris J. Dolan, Striking First (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2004).
59	The full text of this speech can be found at the official White House website
(http://www.whitehouse.gov). See specifically http://www.tinyurl.com/3x5mm
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html)
60	Numerous reports indicate that the United States attempted to kill Taliban leader
Mullah Omar using a Predator UAV equipped with guided missiles. The attack
succeeded in destroying a number of vehicles, but Mullah Omar was apparently in
a nearby building at the time of the attack, safe from the explosion.
61 Publicly available information indicates that the “Secretary of State may offer
rewards of up to $5 million for information that prevents or favorably resolves
acts of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property worldwide.” The
Rewards for Justice Web site (http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/) indicates that
rewards were paid for information leading to the location of Qusay and Uday Hussein, who were subsequently killed by U.S. military forces (ostensibly as a direct
result of the provision of this information). While perhaps not wanted for their
involvement in terrorism, this evidence indicated that the United States is willing
to use such information for purposes of locating and killing specific individuals.
It is clear from this example and from this assessment that the purposefully vague
language “information that prevents or favorably resolves acts of international terrorism” leaves the legal door open for U.S. use of this information for purposes of
targeted killing. This assessment should not be construed to indicate that the sole
purpose of the rewards program is to provide intelligence to facilitate killings. The
program has indeed resulted in the successful arrests and convictions of numerous
high profile terrorists, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Yousef, and Mir
Amal Kansi. It may be interesting to note that the capture and subsequent conviction of Kansi resulted in his execution on November 14, 2002.
62	Walter Pincus, “U.S. Strike Kills Six in al Qaeda,” Washington Post, pg. A1,
November 6, 2002. This article can also be found online at
http://www.tinyurl.com/cesg3s (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?
pagename = article&node =&contentId = A5126-2002Nov4&notFound = true)
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63	Department of Defense News Briefing, November 4, 2004.
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t11042002_t1104sd.html
64	The USS Cole, a U.S. Navy destroyer, was heavily damaged during an al Qaeda
suicide boat attack on October 12, 2000, in the Yemeni port of Aden. The attack
killed seventeen American sailors and injured thirty-nine.
65	These verbatim quotes were drawn from an actual Yellow Card obtained by the
author during the course of research for this paper.
66 Mark Urban, Big Boys Rules (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1993), pg. 164.
67	For a detailed accounting of the Loughall incident, see Mark Urban, Big Boys
Rules (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1993), pgs. 224–237.
68	IRA terrorists frequently stole weapons from police facilities in order to augment
their own supplies of small arms. Forensic examinations of the weapons used by
the IRA at Loughall revealed that they had been used previously in the murders of
policemen and soldiers.
69	Urban, pg. 228.
70	Urban, pg. 232.
71	European Court of Human Rights, “Subject—Matter of Judgments D
 elivered
by the Court in 2001,” pg. 23. Cases cited: No. 24746/95, No. 28883/95,
No.30054/96, and No. 37715/97. http://www.tinyurl.com/d3wkmb
(http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/SUBJECT_MATTER_2001_TABLE.pdf)
72	Ibid.
73	This argument does not discount the myriad difficulties that authorities likely
would have encountered had they tried to arrest the terrorists. It is highly unlikely
that all eight IRA men would have been in the same location. Indeed, available information indicates that at least some of the terrorists were living in the Republic
of Ireland in the days leading up to the attack. Thus, effecting their arrests would
have posed considerable difficulty. Moreover, the police did not know exactly who
would carry out the attack until the time of the attack itself.
74	In fact, it may be argued that a police or military force that fails to interdict such
an individual would be delinquent in its duties. Such was the case in the 1983 terrorist bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Lebanon, in which 243 U.S. personnel were killed.
75 David E. Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism (New York: The Free Press, 1990),
pgs. 29–64.
76 http://www.rand.org/commentary/120303ND.html
77	Author interview, retired 22 SAS operative. July 15, 2005.
78	Netanyahu, pg. 71.
79 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/315216.stm
80 See Mark Urban, Big Boys Rules (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1993).
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81	Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (United Kingdom:
C. Husrts & Co. Ltd., 2002), pgs. 78–79.
82	The author acknowledges here that al Qaeda is no longer a monolithic organization, such as it may have been described prior to 9/11 and the international
military offensive that drove it from its bases in Afghanistan. Today, al Qaeda is a
loose-knit consortium of like-minded Islamic extremists who, though in disparate locations and without a central command and control network, continue to
observe these guidelines for operational security.
83	There have been numerous articles, books, and documentaries published that
describe the Gibraltar incident in detail. See, for example, “Death on the Rock,”
a documentary produced for ITV in Great Britain. Further information on
this excellent program can be found here: http://www.tinyurl.com/4yccf
(http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/D/htmlD/deathonthe/deathonthe.htm)
84	For example, in a paper published in 2003, Steven R. David, Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University, noted that between the start of the
second intifadah in 2000 and the fall of 2002, some twenty Palestinian militants
had been killed, though these attacks had claimed the lives of an estimated fifty innocent bystanders. See Steven R. David, “Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” Ethics
and International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003, pg. 111.
85 http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/05/29/mideast/index.html
86 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/22/world/main607747.shtml
87 http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/19/un.rantisi/index.html;
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/17/mideast.violence/index.html
88 http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/07/23/mideast/
89 http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/28/ret.omar.attack/
90 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1017534.stm
91	The author recognizes here that this incident may not have been a targeted killing, in that it is not known if they were seeking to eliminate a specific individual.
The example is used primarily to highlight the innumerable variables present in
conducting limited military strikes against specific targets and the potential for
unexpected consequences (i.e., the exploding rockets).
92 “Israeli Airstrike on Hamas Van Kills Four,” Associated Press, Jul y 15, 2005.
http://www.tinyurl.com/cypyuw (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050715/
ap_on_re_mi_ea/israel_palestinians_10;_ylt = AreByz8qMA3q4HDpGNR7d0cUvioA;_ylu = X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl)
93 The Economist, “Martyrdom and Murder,” January 8, 2004.
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id = 2329785
94 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ksm.htm
95	A salient example of this occurred in Algeria during the insurgency that occurred
between 1954 and 1962. While at first struggling against the Algerian insurgency,
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 the establishment of a robust intelligence organization (Centre de Coordination
Interarmees) soon resulted in the arrests and interrogations of thousands of
individuals, some of whom were actively involved in acts of terrorism against the
French presence there. The intelligence gained from some of these interrogations
resulted in effective and efficient action against the insurgents and their supporters.
See Peter Harlcerode, Fighting Dirty (London: Cassell & Co., 2001), pgs. 211–268.
96	The Times Online, “World leaders condemn Yassin assassination,” March 22, 2004,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1–1047221,00.html; CNN.com, “Leaders
condemn Yassin killing,” March 23, 2004, http://www.tinyurl.com/cvua5d
(http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/03/22/hamas.reaction/;
EUBusiness.com), “EU ministers condemn Yassin ‘assassination’,” March 22,
2004, http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/040322122424.soccqfav.
97 White House Press Briefing, March 22, 2004. http://www.tinyurl.com/2lj4g
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040322-4.html)
98	Amnesty International press release, “Israel/Occupied Territories: Amnesty
International strongly condemns the assassination of Sheikh Yassin,” March 22,
2004. http://www.tinyurl.com/dnca74 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/
ENGMDE150292004?open&of = ENG-PSE)
99	United Nations Press Release, SC/8039, March 25, 2004.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8039.doc.htm
100	Associated Press, March 23, 2004, “U.S. Vetoes U.N. Resolution Condemning
Killing of HAMAS Leader Yassin,”
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,115242,00.html.
101 http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid = 564
102	For more thorough recounting of the attack and the ensuing Israeli program of
targeted killing “Operation Wrath of God,” please see Simon Reeve, One Day
in September (England: Faber and Faber Ltd., 2000) and Alexander Calahan,
“Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams,” (Marine Corps
Command and General Staff College, April 1995).
103	Reeve, pgs. 183–186.
104	It is worth noting, also, that Meir herself signed the death warrants for those
involved in planning or perpetrating the attacks. See Reeve, pg. 192 and Victor
Ostrovsky and Claire Hoy, By Way of Deception (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1990), pg. 179.
105	Reeve, pg. 180.
106	Reeve, pg. 229.
107	It is further interesting to note that this codification took place only after decades
of the ‘unregulated’ practice of targeted killing, and just two years before the
policy was redacted by the Israeli government.
108 Due to the clandestine nature of many targeted killings, the actual perpetrators
of the attack often does not claim direct credit. Thus, the author endeavored to
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determine the author of the attack in the cases cited in Appendix A, through press
reporting and the available literature.
109 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3635755.stm
110 http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/03/21/yassin/
111 http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid = 2368259
112 http://www.tinyurl.com/cy87mj (http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/
11/05/1036308311314.html?oneclick =true)
113 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1952053.stm
114 http://www.tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID = 6282
115	The missile that killed Dudayev was reportedly fired after his location was pinpointed during his use of a satellite phone. Russian signals intelligence (SIGINT)
reportedly intercepted the phone call and passed the coordinates to a Russian
missile unit kilometers away, which then engaged the target. See Michal Fiszer,
Jerzy Gruszczynski, “Bolt from the blue: Russian land-based precision-strike
missiles,” Journal of Electronic Defense, March 1, 2003.
116 http://www.amina.com/article/did_nsa.html
117 http://www.tinyurl.com/h3zub (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/30/newsid_2542000/2542719.stm)
118 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/forum/760385.stm
119 http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/calahan.htm
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